The COVID-19 pandemic: diverse contexts; different epidemics—how and why? by Van Damme, Wim et al.
 1Van Damme W, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e003098. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-003098
The COVID-19 pandemic: diverse 
contexts; different epidemics—how 
and why?
Wim Van Damme,1 Ritwik Dahake   ,2 Alexandre Delamou,3 Brecht Ingelbeen,1 
Edwin Wouters,4,5 Guido Vanham,6,7 Remco van de Pas,1 Jean- Paul Dossou   ,1,8 
Por Ir,9 Seye Abimbola   ,10,11 Stefaan Van der Borght,12 Devadasan Narayanan,13 
Gerald Bloom,14 Ian Van Engelgem,15 Mohamed Ali Ag Ahmed,16 
Joël Arthur Kiendrébéogo   ,1,17,18 Kristien Verdonck,1 Vincent De Brouwere,1 
Kéfilath Bello,8 Helmut Kloos   ,19 Peter Aaby,20 Andreas Kalk,21 
Sameh Al- Awlaqi   ,22 NS Prashanth   ,23 Jean- Jacques Muyembe- Tamfum,24 
Placide Mbala,24 Steve Ahuka- Mundeke,24 Yibeltal Assefa   25
Analysis
To cite: Van Damme W, 
Dahake R, Delamou A, et al. 
The COVID-19 pandemic: 
diverse contexts; different 
epidemics—how and 
why?BMJ Global Health 
2020;5:e003098. doi:10.1136/
bmjgh-2020-003098
Received 7 June 2020
Revised 2 July 2020
Accepted 4 July 2020
For numbered affiliations see 
end of article.
Correspondence to
Professor Wim Van Damme;  
 wvdamme@ itg. be
© Author(s) (or their 
employer(s)) 2020. Re- use 
permitted under CC BY- NC. No 
commercial re- use. See rights 
and permissions. Published by 
BMJ.
ABSTRACT
It is very exceptional that a new disease becomes a true 
pandemic. Since its emergence in Wuhan, China, in late 
2019, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 
2 (SARS- CoV-2), the virus that causes COVID-19, has 
spread to nearly all countries of the world in only a few 
months. However, in different countries, the COVID-19 
epidemic takes variable shapes and forms in how it affects 
communities. Until now, the insights gained on COVID-19 
have been largely dominated by the COVID-19 epidemics 
and the lockdowns in China, Europe and the USA. But this 
variety of global trajectories is little described, analysed or 
understood. In only a few months, an enormous amount 
of scientific evidence on SARS- CoV-2 and COVID-19 has 
been uncovered (knowns). But important knowledge gaps 
remain (unknowns). Learning from the variety of ways 
the COVID-19 epidemic is unfolding across the globe can 
potentially contribute to solving the COVID-19 puzzle. 
This paper tries to make sense of this variability—by 
exploring the important role that context plays in these 
different COVID-19 epidemics; by comparing COVID-19 
epidemics with other respiratory diseases, including 
other coronaviruses that circulate continuously; and 
by highlighting the critical unknowns and uncertainties 
that remain. These unknowns and uncertainties require 
a deeper understanding of the variable trajectories 
of COVID-19. Unravelling them will be important for 
discerning potential future scenarios, such as the first 
wave in virgin territories still untouched by COVID-19 and 
for future waves elsewhere.
INTRODUCTION
Late in 2019, a cluster of acute respiratory 
disease in Wuhan, China, was attributed to 
a new coronavirus,1–3 later named severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS- CoV-2).4 It was soon discovered that 
the virus is easily transmitted, can cause 
Summary box
 ► Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS- CoV-2), the virus that causes COVID-19, has 
spread to nearly all countries of the world in only a 
few months. It is unique that an emerging respira-
tory virus becomes a pandemic, and can continue 
human- to- human transmission unabated, probably 
permanently.
 ► Depending on the context, the trajectory and the im-
pact of the COVID-19 epidemic vary widely across 
affected countries. This is in fact the case with most 
infectious diseases.
 ► Despite limited initial knowledge on COVID-19, most 
societies have deployed draconian measures, in-
cluding lockdowns, to contain the virus and mitigate 
its impact. This had variable success, but invariably 
with profound socioeconomic collateral effects.
 ► Through research and rapid sharing of its findings, 
progressively more insights on SARS- CoV-2 and 
COVID-19 have been uncovered (knowns), main-
ly based on evidence from China, Europe and the 
USA; however, important knowledge gaps remain 
(unknowns).
 ► The different COVID-19 epidemics and the respons-
es unfolding in the Global South are little described, 
analysed or understood. Insights from these less 
researched contexts are important for discerning 
potential future scenarios, not only for the first wave 
in virgin territories still untouched by COVID-19, but 
also for future waves.
 ► More understanding of lived experiences of people in 
a variety of contexts is necessary to get a full global 
picture and allow learning from this variety.
 ► BMJ Global Health and Emerging Voices for Global 
Health have launched a call for such on- the- ground 
narratives and analyses on the epidemics of, and re-
sponses to, COVID-19.
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severe disease and can be quite lethal especially in the 
elderly and those with comorbidities.5–8 The new human 
disease is called COVID-19.9 Soon it became clear that 
its global spread was unstoppable. Even with draconian 
containment measures, such as strict movement restric-
tions, the so- called lockdown, it spread, and within a few 
months reached almost all countries and was declared a 
pandemic by the WHO.10 Table 1 summarises key events 
in the unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic, from 
December 2019 to May 2020.
This progression is quite unique. New human patho-
gens emerge frequently from an animal host, but most 
cause only a local outbreak. Human- to- human trans-
mission stops at some point, and the virus can only 
re- emerge as a human pathogen from its animal host. 
Only very rarely does an emerging pathogen become a 
pandemic. Over the past decades, a totally new pathogen 
emerged, caused serious disease, and spread around the 
globe continuously only once before: the HIV. It seems 
increasingly likely that SARS- CoV-2 transmission will 
be continuing. All countries are now facing their own 
‘COVID-19 epidemic’.
In only a few months, the scientific community has 
started to learn the virus’s characteristics and its manifes-
tations in different contexts.11 But we fail to understand 
fully why the virus spreads at different speeds and affects 
populations differently. Our main objective is to make 
sense of those different expressions of the COVID-19 
pandemic, to understand why COVID-19 follows vari-
able trajectories in ways that are often quite different 
from the collective image created by the mediatisation of 
the dramatic COVID-19 epidemics in densely populated 
areas.
We start by exploring the role of context, followed by 
a brief summary of what is already known at the time 
of writing about SARS- CoV-2 and COVID-19. We then 
Table 1 Key events in the COVID-19 pandemic, December 2019–May 2020
Month Key events
December 2019  ► Clusters of pneumonia of unknown origin in Wuhan, China.
 ► Human infection probably began sometime between 9 October and 20 December 2019.69
 ► WHO alerted of a novel coronavirus on 31 December 2019.
 ► Several cases in Hubei Province, China, and probably already spread to surrounding areas.
 ► The virus may have already been spreading in France late December 2019.70
January 2020  ► First case outside China reported in Thailand on 13 January 2020.
 ► Cases reported in at least 24 countries, mostly in South and Southeast Asia; also in Europe, the USA, 
Canada and the United Arab Emirates.71
 ► The ‘new disease’ declared a ‘Public Health Emergency of International Concern’ on 30 January 2020.
 ► Mostly ‘imported cases only’, mainly travellers from China. Soon ‘export’ of virus from other countries 
started.
 ► The Wuhan lockdown,72 which later inspired a series of lockdowns across the world.
February 2020  ► The new disease named COVID-19 on 11 February 2020.
 ► Cruise ship Princess Diamond quarantined near Japan, sparking media attention.
 ► Epidemic in China peaked with ~80 000 cases and 2900 deaths (80% of cases restricted to the Hubei 
Province).73
 ► Local epidemics of varying attack rates and case fatality rates in 58 countries with imported cases 
causing ‘local transmission’ reported from 20 countries.
 ► South Korea, Italy and Iran emerged as new epicentres.
March 2020  ► Europe engulfed with local epidemics.
 ► Over 170 countries were affected worldwide.
 ► The epidemic in China seemed to have plateaued.
 ► WHO declared the epidemic a pandemic.
 ► China partially lifted lockdown while India instituted the world’s biggest complete lockdown affecting 
~1.4 billion people.74
April 2020  ► COVID-19 cases crossed 1 million with more than 50 000 deaths.
 ► The US emerged as the most affected country with epicentre in New York.
 ► Aerosols implicated in the transmission (prompting ‘mass masking’ of the general public).
 ► WHO warned that Africa will be the future epicentre of COVID-19.
May 2020  ► South America became the new epicentre of COVID-19.
 ► More than 325 000 deaths globally with ~5 million cases in 216 countries/territories/areas.
 ► At the time of writing (end of May 2020), no effective medication and/or vaccine exist.
 ► The pandemic appeared to have slowed down in countries such as South Korea, Italy, Spain, France 
and the rest of Europe.
 ► In Africa, the number of cases seemed to fall short of forecasts.
 ► Tremendous socioeconomic fallouts after an estimated 4.5 billion persons (more than half of humanity) 
subjected to social distancing norms and/or lockdowns.75
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compare these knowns with what is known of some 
other viral respiratory pathogens and identify the crit-
ical unknowns. We also discuss the coping strategies and 
collective strategies implemented to contain and miti-
gate the effect of the epidemic. We finally look ahead to 
potential future scenarios.
THE UNFOLDING COVID-19 PANDEMIC: IMPORTANCE OF 
CONTEXT
Initially, human- to- human transmission was documented 
in family/friends clusters.12–17 Progressively, it became 
clear that superspreading events, typically during social 
gatherings such as parties, religious services, weddings, 
sports events and carnival celebrations, have played an 
important role.18–21 Dense transmission has also been 
documented in hospitals22 and nursing homes possibly 
through aerosols.23 24
SARS- CoV-2 has spread around the world through 
international travellers. The timing of the introduction 
of SARS- CoV-2 has largely depended on the intensity 
of connections with locations with ongoing COVID-19 
epidemics; thus, it reached big urban centres first and, 
within these, often the most affluent groups. From there, 
the virus has spread at variable speeds to other population 
groups.25 26
As of May 2020, the most explosive COVID-19 
epidemics observed have been in densely populated 
areas in temperate climates in relatively affluent 
countries.27 The COVID-19 pandemic and the lock-
downs have been covered intensively in the media and 
have shaped our collective image of the COVID-19 
epidemic, both in the general public and in the scien-
tific community.
The COVID-19 epidemic has spread more slowly and less 
intensively in rural areas, in Africa and the Indian subcon-
tinent, and the rural areas of low and lower- middle income 
countries (LICs/LMICs). Not only the media but also the 
scientific community has paid much less attention to these 
realities, emerging later and spreading more slowly.
The dominant thinking has been that it is only a ques-
tion of time before dramatic epidemics occur every-
where. This thinking, spread globally by international 
public health networks, has been substantiated by predic-
tive mathematical models based largely on data from the 
epidemics of the Global North. However, what has been 
observed elsewhere is quite different although not neces-
sarily less consequential.28
The effects of the COVID-19 epidemic manifest in 
peculiar ways in each context. In the early stages of the 
COVID-19 epidemic in sub- Saharan Africa, the virus first 
affected the urban elites with international connections. 
From there, it was seeded to other sections of the society 
more slowly. In contrast, the collateral effects of a lock-
down, even partial in many cases, are mostly felt by the 
urban poor, as ‘stay home’ orders abruptly intensify hard-
ship for those earning their daily living in the informal 
urban economy. Governments of LICs/LMICs lack the 
budgetary space to grant generous benefit packages to 
counter the socioeconomic consequences. International 
agencies are very thinly spread, as the pandemic has been 
concurrent everywhere. Donor countries have focused 
mainly on their own COVID-19 epidemics.
The epidemic is thus playing out differently in different 
contexts. Many factors might explain SARS- CoV-2 trans-
mission dynamics. Climate, population structure, social 
practices, pre- existing immunity and many other vari-
ables that have been explored are summarised in table 2.
Although all these variables probably play some role, 
many uncertainties remain. It is difficult to assess how 
much these variables influence transmission in different 
contexts. It is even more difficult to assess how they 
interact and change over time and influence transmis-
sion among different social groups, resulting in the pecu-
liar COVID-19 epidemic in any particular context.
INSIGHTS FROM OTHER VIRUSES
We do not attempt to give a complete overview of viruses 
but select only those viruses that emerged recently and 
caused epidemics such as Ebola, that have obvious simi-
larities in transmission patterns such as influenza and 
measles, or that are closely related such as other corona-
viruses.
Emerging viral respiratory pathogens
Respiratory viruses such as severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus (SARS- CoV), Middle East respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus (MERS- CoV) and avian influ-
enza A and also Ebola have originated from animal hosts 
and caused human diseases (table 3). These viruses do not 
continuously circulate from human to human. They create 
an outbreak only when there is interspecies cross- over trans-
mission, most frequently from bats to another animal host.
The first human case of a disease from an emerging 
viral pathogen, the ‘index case’ or ‘patient zero’, is invari-
ably someone in close contact with the originating animal 
host or an intermediary animal host. If this contact occurs 
in a remote rural community, the spread is usually slow, at 
low intensity, and could fade out before the pathogen gets 
a chance to spread to another community. The spread 
can suddenly intensify if seeded in a densely populated 
community, frequently in a particular context such as a 
hospital or during a social event, often referred to as a 
superspreading event. When the spread reaches a city, it 
can become a major outbreak, from where it can spread 
further; this happened with SARS- CoV in Hong Kong in 
2003 and with Ebola in Conakry, Freetown and Monrovia 
in 2014–2016.29 30 But at some stage human- to- human 
transmission is interrupted and the outbreak stops.
Only very exceptionally can a new viral pathogen sustain 
continuous human- to- human transmission. Other viral 
diseases such as measles and influenza are ‘old’ diseases; 
they have been studied in great depth. What can we learn 
from them?
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Measles and influenza: the importance of context
It is thought that measles emerged thousands of years 
ago in the Middle East. It is assumed that a cross- over 
occurred from the rinderpest virus,31 to become the 
human measles virus. Measles has since spread around 
the globe in continuous human- to- human transmis-
sion. When measles, along with other viruses such as 
smallpox and influenza, was introduced in the Americas 
by European conquerors, it contributed to a massive 
die- off of up to 90% of the original population.32
Table 2 Contextual variables potentially influencing transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2
Variable Elements Range (variation/extremes)
Population density  ► People per km²
 ► People per household
 ► Indoor space (m²) per person
Big European/USA/
Chinese cities
Rural areas
Megacities with urban 
slums
Social demography  ► Age structure: proportion of elderly and children
 ► Household composition: nuclear versus 
multigenerational
 ► Mixing patterns, including mode of transport
 ► Forms of religious and social events
Italy, Europe Sub- Saharan Africa, 
Southeast Asia
Social practices  ► Mode of greeting and social contact (shaking 
hands, kissing, hugging, etc.)
 ► Handwashing, water and sanitation
 ► Ventilation and air conditioning
High- income countries 
or areas
Slums
Geography  ► Climate
 ► Urbanisation rate
 ► Air traffic intensity
 ► Population movements
 ► Road networks
Europe, USA Sub- Saharan Africa, 
Brazil, India
Pre- existing immunity  ► Prior exposure to other coronaviruses, BCG 
vaccine, and so on.
 ► Non- specific immunity?
High- income countries Low- income countries 
in tropical climates
Genetic factors  ► ACE variability
 ► HLA variability
    
ACE, angiotensin- converting enzyme; HLA, human leucocyte antigen.
Table 3 Examples of emerging human respiratory viral diseases without sustained human- to- human transmission
Virus
Originating 
animal host Characteristics No. of cases; CFR
SARS- CoV Bat  ► First emerged in China in November 2002.76
 ► Causes severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS).
 ► Transmission through superspreading events in 
healthcare facilities.77
8422 cases; CFR:10%78
MERS- CoV Bat  ► First emerged in the Middle East in 2012.79
 ► Causes Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS).
 ► Outbreaks from 2012 to 2019 in Saudi Arabia and one 
outbreak in South Korea (2015).
2502 cases; CFR: 34%79
Avian influenza A 
(H5N1 and H7N9)
Birds/poultry  ► Subtypes of influenza viruses detected in birds 
(having killed millions of poultry) but with ‘pandemic 
potential’ (WHO).80
 ► H5N1 first detected in humans in 1997 in China with 
widespread emergence in 2003–2004; no sustained 
community- level transmission.80
 ► H7N9 first detected in humans in China in 2013.81
  H5N1: 649 cases; CFR: 
60%82
  H7N9: 571 cases; CFR: 
37%81
Ebola virus Bat  ► First appeared in 1976 and caused over 20 
documented ‘major’ outbreaks.83
 ► Largest epidemics in 2014–2016 in Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone.
 ► Ongoing epidemic in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.
Over 30 000 cases; average 
CFR: 50%83
CFR, case fatality rates.
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The transmission dynamics of SARS- CoV-2 can be 
compared with influenza. Influenza typically causes 
yearly epidemics in temperate climates during winter 
with less seasonal patterns in tropical or subtropical 
regions.33 34 In hotter climates, such as in sub- Saharan 
Africa33 or South and Southeast Asia,34 it is transmitted 
year round, often not identified as influenza. Such 
different epidemic patterns of influenza are still incom-
pletely understood but thought to be associated with 
temperature and humidity and human behavioural 
factors such as indoor crowding.35
But, in contrast to SARS- CoV-2, the influenza virus is 
not new. Influenza is a very old disease, certainly circu-
lating for several centuries. It has infected most human 
beings living on the planet already, many of them several 
times, leaving some immunity but no durable protection. 
The virus also mutates, giving rise to a new dominant 
strain every influenza season. Influenza is every year a 
slightly different virus (due to antigenic drift as a result of 
progressive mutations) with major differences every few 
decades (antigenic shift as a result of recombination with 
novel strains).
One such antigenic shift resulted in the 1918 H1N1 
‘Spanish’ Influenza pandemic, which had an estimated 
case fatality rate (CFR) of 2%–3%, killing millions.36 
Box 1 summarises some key facts about H1N1, including 
factors thought to be associated with its high CFR.
A major difference between COVID-19 and influenza is 
that SARS- CoV-2 is a new pathogen and influenza is not. 
At the time of writing (May 2020), SARS- CoV-2 has trig-
gered an immune response in over 5 million confirmed 
infections (and probably in many more), definitely too 
few to create anything close to herd immunity. Calcula-
tions using an estimated reproductive number (R0) for 
SARS- CoV-2 suggest that herd immunity would require at 
least 60% of the population to have protective immunity 
(see box 2).37
Like COVID-19, measles and influenza have different 
epidemic patterns in different contexts. This also is 
the case for cholera, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and most 
infectious diseases. The difference in patterns is most 
pronounced and so is easily understood with vector- 
borne and water- borne diseases. Epidemic patterns are 
also different for air- borne infections, although they 
are less easily understood. Transmission of respiratory 
viruses is influenced by factors related to the virus and 
Box 1 Pandemic H1N1 influenza, 1918–2009
 ► The 1918 H1N1 virus probably infected one- third of the world’s 
population at that time (or ~500 million people).84
 ► The pandemic had three waves in quick succession; the second 
wave, in 1919, was worse than the first wave.84
 ► High mortality, especially in younger persons (5–15 years; ~25% 
of total deaths) in the 1918 pandemic, may have been due to 
antibody- dependent enhancement and ‘cytokine storms’.84 Another 
possible explanation is that older persons had some protective 
cross- immunity from previous influenza outbreaks while younger 
persons did not.
 ► H1N1 continued to circulate along with seasonal influenza viruses, 
often recombining to produce more severe local outbreaks, includ-
ing other pandemics between 1918 and 2009, giving it the nick-
name ‘mother of all pandemics’.
 ► The original 1918 H1N1 strain was replaced by A(H1N1)pdm09 vi-
rus that resulted from an antigenic shift and caused the 2009 H1N1 
influenza pandemic.
 ► The 2009 H1N1 virus originated in pigs in central Mexico in March 
2009 and was responsible for an estimated 284 000 deaths world-
wide with an estimated CFR<0.1%.85 86
 ► During the 2009 pandemic, mortality was much lower than in 
the 1918 pandemic. Higher mortality in persons younger than 65 
years was related to cytokine storms.87 A role of protective cross- 
immunity from previous influenza strains in older persons has been 
suggested.
 ► After August 2010, the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus appeared to have inte-
grated with circulating strains of influenza and continues to cause 
localised seasonal influenza outbreaks worldwide.88
Box 2 On the use of mathematical models during 
epidemics
 A dominant way of studying the transmission dynamics of an 
infectious disease such as COVID-19, and predicting the amplitude 
and peak of the epidemic in a population (city, province, country) 
and analysing the effect of control measures is using mathematical 
models. Based on available data and several assumptions, a model 
attempts to predict the course of the epidemic, the expected 
number of infections, clinical cases and deaths over time. Critical 
is the effective reproductive number (Rt). When Rt >1, the number 
of cases in a population increases; when Rt <1, the number of 
cases decreases. A relatively simple and widely used model is the 
susceptible- exposed- infectious- recovered model, as used in the 
two papers recently published in BMJ Global Health on COVID-19 
in Africa.67 89 There are many more types of models, with varying 
degrees of complexity.
 The use of such models has strengths and limitations. 
Building a mathematical model implies trade- offs between accuracy, 
transparency, flexibility and timeliness. A difficulty, in general, is 
that the parameters on which the model is based, the so- called 
assumptions are frequently uncertain (table 7) and predictions can 
vary widely if any of the parameters are modestly different. This 
uncertainty is captured in a sensitivity analysis, leading to various 
possible quantitative outcomes, usually expressed as a range 
of plausible possibilities, between ‘worst- case’ and ‘best- case’ 
scenarios.
 With a new disease such as COVID-19, certainly at the start 
of the outbreak, the parameters had to be based on very limited 
data from a particular context. However, many variables can widely 
differ across communities as they critically depend on contextual 
factors (table 2). In mathematical models, all such uncertainties and 
unknowns are somehow hidden in the complex formulae of the model, 
as a quasi ‘black box’. Few people have the knowledge and skill to 
‘open up the black box’.
 As uncertainties in COVID-19 are large, the range of possibilities 
produced by a model is wide, with the worst- case scenario typically 
predicting catastrophic numbers of cases and deaths. Such 
predictions are often misunderstood by journalists, practitioners 
and policy- makers, with worst- case estimates getting the most 
attention,68 not specifying the huge uncertainties.
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the human host but also by factors related to the natural 
and human environment (table 4).
However, we are quite unable to explain fully which 
factor has which influence, how these factors vary among 
different social groups and how interdependent or 
isolated they are. We are certainly unable to fully model 
all these variables mathematically to explain the epidemic 
pattern across a variety of different contexts. Too many 
variables and their interrelations are difficult to quantify, 
and when all these factors change over time while the 
pathogen continues to spread in diverse societies, the 
complexity becomes daunting.
Understanding transmission dynamics is a bit less 
daunting for measles, as several variables are well known 
and rather constant across individuals and contexts. 
The natural transmission pattern of measles, before 
the introduction of vaccines, has been well described. 
Measles is mostly a childhood disease, but this is not the 
case in very remote communities, where measles trans-
mission had been interrupted for extended periods 
(such as the Faroe Islands).38 39 Measles affected all age 
groups when reaching new territories, causing dramatic 
first- wave epidemics, a phenomenon called ‘virgin soil 
epidemic’.40 41 The latest stages of the global dissemina-
tion of measles have been well documented, including in 
Australia, the Fiji islands and the Arctic countries, where 
such virgin soil epidemics occurred in the 19th and the 
mid- 20th centuries.32 42 Fortunately, measles infection 
creates robust protective immunity and after a first wave 
becomes a typical childhood disease, affecting only those 
without any prior immunity.43 Human- to- human trans-
mission of measles virus in a community stops when the 
virus cannot find new susceptible human hosts and the 
so- called herd immunity is reached.44 45 But transmis-
sion of measles continues elsewhere on the planet from 
where it can be reintroduced a few years later when the 
population without protective immunity has grown large 
enough to allow human- to- human transmission again.
The epidemic patterns of measles are easily understood 
as measles is highly infectious, creates disease in almost 
every infected person and leaves lifelong natural immunity. 
Measles circulation, prior to vaccination, was continuous 
only in large urban areas with high birth rates. Every-
where else reintroduction occurred typically every 3–5 
Table 4 Factors related to transmission patterns and severity of respiratory viruses
Factor Variables
Virus  ► Infection efficiency, transmissibility.
 ► Capacity to survive outside the human body (including in aerosols, in droplets, on surfaces, in stools, in 
intermediate animal hosts, etc.)
 ► Potential to shed virus from an infected person, asymptomatic or diseased.
 ► Genetic stability or variability (affecting the potential of long- lasting immunity).
 ► Viral load determines the incubation period with the formula high load ->short incubation period ->high 
severity.
Human host  ► Human susceptibility to the virus; transfer of parental immunity to newborns.
 ► Route and efficiency of human- to- human transmission.
 ► Presence and capacity of asymptomatic carriers to transmit the virus.
 ► Immunity created after infection, its robustness and how long- lasting it is.
 ► Severity and duration of the disease: proportion symptomatic, lethality (CFR).
 ► Pathogenicity and disease spectrum; disease pattern according to age and comorbidities, and related 
potential to spread.
Natural 
environment
 ► Temperature, humidity and seasonal changes in climate affecting the stability and transmission 
potential of the virus and human susceptibility.
 ► Increasing extreme weather conditions such as droughts and severe storms, as well as global climate 
change may also affect transmission patterns.
 ► Air pollution may also play a role in the transmission and stability of the virus.
Human 
environment/social 
geography
 ► Demographic variables such as population density, age structure and household composition.
 ► Mixing patterns within households, including bed sleeping patterns, related to housing conditions and 
hygiene practices.
 ► House construction with solid walls or permeable walls (thatched walls, straw mats).
 ► Mixing patterns among households related to settlement patterns: social networks, urban–rural 
differences, working conditions, religious practices and commuting patterns.
 ► Variables related to built environments, road infrastructure and socioeconomic conditions.
 ► Mobility between communities, including international travel.
 ► Crowding institutions: for example, elderly homes, extended families, boarding schools, child 
institutions, seclusion during tribal ceremonies, hospitals, nursing homes, military barracks and 
prisons.
CFR, case fatality rate.
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years but sometimes only after 10 or 15 years in isolated 
rural communities (such as among nomadic groups in 
the Sahel), causing epidemics among all those without 
acquired immunity and having lost maternal antibodies.46 
These diverse patterns of measles epidemics have been 
fundamentally changed by variable coverage of measles 
vaccination. They can still help us make sense of the diver-
sity of COVID-19 epidemics being observed in 2020.
Measles illustrates convincingly that the transmission 
pattern of a respiratory virus is strongly influenced by the 
demographic composition, density and mixing pattern 
of the population and the connectedness to big urban 
centres. Measles transmission is continuous only in some 
large urban areas. It presents in short epidemics every-
where else with variable periodicity. This transmission 
pattern may well be a bit similar for COVID-19. But it 
took thousands of years for measles to reach all human 
communities while SARS- CoV-2 spread to all countries 
in only a few months, despite measles being much more 
transmissible than SARS- CoV-2. Factors such as increased 
air travel and more dense community structures play 
bigger roles for SARS- CoV-2 than they did for measles.
Comparison with other pathogenic coronaviruses
SARS- CoV-2 has many close relatives. Six other human 
coronaviruses (HCoVs) are known to infect humans. 
SARS- CoV and MERS- CoV (causing SARS and MERS, 
respectively) are very rare and do not continuously circu-
late among humans. The other four (HCoV- 229E, HCoV- 
OC43, HCoV- HKU1 and HCoV- NL63) cause the common 
cold or diarrhoea and continuously circulate and mutate 
frequently.47 48 They can cause disease in the same person 
repeatedly. The typical coronavirus remains localised to 
the epithelium of the upper respiratory tract, causes mild 
disease and elicits a poor immune response, hence the 
high rate of reinfection (in contrast to SARS- CoV and 
MERS- CoV, which go deeper into the lungs and hence 
are relatively less contagious). There is no cross- immunity 
between HCoV- 229E and HCoV- OC43, and new strains 
arise continually by mutation selection.49
COPING STRATEGIES AND COLLECTIVE STRATEGIES
How a virus spreads and its disease progresses depend 
not only on the variables described above (table 4) but 
also on the human reactions deployed when people are 
confronted with a disease outbreak or the threat of an 
outbreak. All these variables combined result in what 
unfolds as ‘the epidemic’ and the diverse ways it affects 
communities.
What a population experiences during an epidemic is 
not fully characterised by the numbers of known infec-
tions and deaths at the scale of a country. Such numbers 
hide regional and local differences, especially in large 
and diverse countries. The epidemic reaches the different 
geographical areas of a country at different moments and 
with different intensities. It affects different communi-
ties in variable ways, influencing how these communities 
perceive it and react to it. What constitutes a local 
COVID-19 epidemic is thus also characterised by the 
perceptions and the reactions it triggers in the different 
sections of the society.
Even before the virus reaches a community, the threat 
of an epidemic already causes fear, stress and anxiety. 
Consequently, the threat or arrival of the epidemic also 
triggers responses, early or late, with various degrees of 
intensity and effectiveness. The response to an epidemic 
can be divided into individual and household actions 
(coping strategies), and collectively organised strategies 
(collective strategies). Coping strategies are the actions 
people and families take when disease threatens and sick-
ness occurs, including the ways they try to protect them-
selves from contagion. Collective strategies are voluntary 
or mandated measures deployed by organised commu-
nities and public authorities in response to an epidemic. 
These include, among others, isolation of the sick or the 
healthy, implementation of hygiene practices and phys-
ical distancing measures. They can also include mobility 
restrictions such as quarantine and cordon sanitaire. Coping 
strategies and collective strategies also include treatment 
of the sick, which critically depends on the availability 
and effectiveness of diagnostic and therapeutic tools, and 
performance of the health system. Collective strategies 
also include research being deployed to further scientific 
insight and the development of diagnostic and thera-
peutic tools, potentially including a vaccine.
Implementation of these measures depends not only 
on resources available but also on the understanding 
and interpretation of the disease by both the scientific 
community and the community at large, influenced by 
the information people receive from scientists, public 
authorities and the media. This information is inter-
preted within belief systems and influenced by rumours, 
increasingly so over social media, including waves of fake 
news, recently labelled ‘infodemics’.50
Coping strategies and collective strategies start immedi-
ately, while there are still many unknowns and uncertain-
ties. Progressively, as the pandemic unfolds and scientists 
interpret observations in the laboratory, in the clinic, 
and in society, more insights are gained and inform the 
response.
Table 5 lists measures recommended by the WHO for 
preventing transmission and slowing down the COVID-19 
epidemic.51–53 ‘Lockdown’ first employed in early 2020 
in Wuhan, China, is the label often given to the bundle 
of containment and mitigation measures promoted or 
imposed by public authorities, although the specific 
measures may vary greatly between countries. In China, 
lockdown was very strictly applied and enforced. It clearly 
had an impact, resulting in total interruption of transmis-
sion locally.54 55
This list or catalogue of measures is quite comprehen-
sive; it includes all measures that at first sight seem to 
reduce transmission opportunities for a respiratory virus. 
However, knowledge is lacking about the effectiveness of 
each measure in different contexts. As a global health 
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agency, the WHO recommends a ‘generic catalogue’ of 
measures from which all countries can select an appro-
priate mix at any one time depending on the phase of 
the epidemic, categorised in four transmission scenarios 
(no cases, first cases, first clusters, and community trans-
mission).52 However, under pressure to act and with little 
time to consider variable options, public authorities often 
adopted as ‘blueprint’ with limited consideration for the 
socioeconomic context.53 56
The initial lockdown in China thus much inspired the 
collective strategies elsewhere. This has been referred to 
as ‘global mimicry’,57: the response is somehow partly 
‘copy/paste’ from measures observed previously (strong 
path dependency).
Some epidemiologists in Northern Europe (including 
the UK,58 Sweden59 and the Netherlands60) pleaded 
against strict containment measures and proposed that 
building up herd immunity against SARS- CoV-2 might be 
wiser. Towards early April 2020, it became increasingly 
clear that reaching herd immunity in the short term was 
illusive. Most countries thus backed off from the herd 
immunity approach to combating COVID-19 and imple-
mented lockdowns.61 The intensity of the lockdowns has 
been variable, ranging from very strict (‘Chinese, Wuhan 
style’), over intermediary (‘French/Italian/New York 
City style’ and ‘Hong Kong style’), to relaxed (‘Swedish 
style’), or piecemeal.
The effectiveness of lockdowns largely depends on at 
what stage of the epidemic they are started, and how 
intensively they are applied. This is quite variable across 
countries, depending on the understanding and motiva-
tion of the population and their perceived risk (‘willing-
ness to adhere’), on the trust they have in government 
advice (‘willingness to comply’), and on the degree of 
enforcement by public authorities. The feasibility for 
different population groups to follow these measures 
depends largely on their socioeconomic and living 
conditions. It is obviously more difficult for people living 
in crowded shacks in urban slums to practise physical 
distancing measures and strict hand hygiene when water 
is scarce than for people living in wealthier parts of a city.
Collateral effects of the response
Every intervention against the COVID-19 epidemic has 
a certain degree of effect and comes at a cost with collat-
eral effects. Each collective strategy (1) has intended and 
unintended consequences (some are more or less desir-
able); (2) is more or less feasible and/or acceptable in a 
given context and for certain subgroups in that society; 
(3) has a cost, not only in financial terms but in many 
other ways, such as restrictions on movement and behav-
iour, stress, uncertainty and others. These costs are more 
or less acceptable, depending on the perception of the 
risk and many societal factors; (4) can be implemented 
with more or less intensity; and (5) can be enforced more 
or less vigorously.
The balance between benefit and cost is crucial in 
judging whether measures are appropriate, which is very 
context specific. Furthermore, benefits and costs are also 
related to the positionality from which they are anal-
ysed: benefits for whom and costs borne by whom? More 
wealthy societies with strong social safety nets can afford 
increased temporary unemployment. This is much more 
consequential in poorer countries, where large propor-
tions of the population live precarious lives and where 
public authorities cannot implement generous mitiga-
tion measures at scale.
The adherence to hygiene and distancing measures 
depends not only on living conditions but also on risk 
perception and cultural norms. Mass masking has been 
readily accepted in some Asian countries, where it was 
already broadly practised even before the COVID-19 
Table 5 Measures recommended by the WHO for preventing transmission and slowing down the COVID-19 epidemic, 2020
Implementation level Intervention
Individual  ► Hand hygiene: handwashing or use of hydroalcoholic solution.
 ► Physical distancing.
 ► Respiratory etiquette.
 ► Masks for infected and symptomatic individuals.
Community  ► Mass masking with surgical and/or homemade masks by everyone in public spaces.
 ► Avoid crowding and mass gatherings.
Public authorities  ► Tracing, testing and isolating cases and providing them with appropriate care.
 ► Tracking, quarantining and monitoring of asymptomatic contacts.
 ► Protecting health workers and vulnerable groups.
 ► Environmental cleaning and sanitising.
 ► Closures of schools, places of worship, sporting events, non- essential shops.
 ► Workplace closures and other measures: work from home where possible and/or reduction in 
workforce capacity.
 ► Public transportation closures.
 ► Stay- at- home orders.
 ► Limiting national and international travel.
 ► Maintaining essential health services.
 ► Ensuring continuity of essential social and economic functions and services.
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epidemic. It remains more controversial in Western soci-
eties, some of which even have legal bans on veiling in 
public places.
Lockdowns are unprecedented and have triggered 
intensive public debate. Not surprisingly, the impact 
of lighter lockdowns on the transmission is much less 
impressive; they decrease transmission but do not stop 
it. Quite rapidly, the justification for lockdowns shifted 
from stopping transmission to ‘flattening the curve’. 
Also, once a lockdown is started, rationalised, explained 
and enforced, it is difficult to decide when to stop it. Exit 
scenarios, usually some form of progressive relaxation, 
are implemented with the knowledge that transmission 
will be facilitated again.62
KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS ABOUT SARS-COV-2/COVID-19
What we already know
The available information on SARS- CoV-2 and the spec-
trum of COVID-19 disease is summarised in tables 6 and 
7. It is increasingly becoming clear that most transmis-
sion happens indoors and that superspreading events 
trigger intensive dissemination.
The virology and immunology of SARS- CoV-2/
COVID-19 are being studied intensively. This is critical 
not only to understand what will potentially happen in 
future waves but also for the development of a vaccine. 
Some scientists and companies are very upbeat about 
the possibility of producing a vaccine in record time. 
Having a vaccine is one thing, but how effective it is, 
is quite another. As acquired immunity after a natural 
infection is probably not very robust (table 6), it will 
also be challenging to trigger robust immunity with a 
vaccine, but perhaps it is not impossible. Many ques-
tions remain, some of which are summarised in table 8.
Regarding the severity of COVID-19, initial fears of very 
high mortality have also lessened. It has progressively 
become clear that many infections remain asymptomatic, 
that severe disease is rare in children and young adults, 
and that mortality is heavily concentrated in the very old 
and those with comorbidities. Table 7 summarises a fuller 
overview of the present state of knowledge regarding 
COVID-19.
With COVID-19 epidemics unfolding rapidly, several 
of the variables in the transmission of SARS- CoV-2 and 
the disease spectrum of COVID-19 could be quantified. 
This allows for mathematical modelling. Several models 
have been quickly developed, leading to predictions of 
the speed of transmission and the burden of COVID-19 
(box 2). Predictive models developed by the Imperial 
College63; the Center for Disease Dynamics, Economics 
& Policy and Johns Hopkins University28; the Institute for 
Health Metrics and Evaluation64; Harvard University65; 
and the WHO,66 including an ‘African model’,67 are a 
few that are influencing containment strategies around 
the world.
Critical unknowns and uncertainties
Although the COVID-19 pandemic triggered unprece-
dented research efforts globally, with over 30 000 scien-
tific papers published between January and April 2020, 
there are still critical unknowns and many uncertainties.
Tables 6 and 7 summarise many of the knowns, but their 
relative importance or weight is not clear. For instance, 
the virus can spread via droplets, hands, aerosols, fomites 
and possibly through the environment. However, the rela-
tive importance of these in various contexts is much less 
clear. These factors undoubtedly vary between settings, 
whether in hospitals, in elderly homes, or at mass events. 
The weight of the variables also probably differs between 
the seeding and initial spread in a community and the 
spread when it suddenly amplifies and intensifies. The 
importance of each variable probably also depends on 
climatic conditions, not only outdoors, but also on micro-
climates indoors, influenced by ventilation and air condi-
tioning and built environments.
We summarise the critical unknowns in table 9 along 
some elements to consider in addressing the unknowns 
and thoughts on their importance.
Uncertainty remains, leading to controversy and 
directly influencing the choice of containment measures. 
Controversy continues regarding when and where lock-
down or more selective measures are equally effective 
with lower societal effects.
Relationship between the dose of the initial infectious 
inoculum, transmission dynamics and severity of the 
COVID-19 disease
New evidence is being discovered rapidly. Some evidence 
comes from field observations and ecological studies; other 
evidence results from scientific experiments or obser-
vations in the laboratory and the clinic. Sense- making 
by combining insights from different observations and 
through the lens of various disciplines can lead to hypoth-
eses that can be tested and verified or refuted. One such 
hypothesis is that there is a relationship between the dose 
of virus in the infectious inoculum and the severity of 
COVID-19 disease. Several intriguing observations in the 
current pandemic could be (partially) explained by such 
a relationship. We develop this hypothesis in box 3, as an 
example of possible further research, to create new insight 
which may influence control strategies.
This viral inoculum theory is consistent with many 
observations from the early stages of the COVID-19 
pandemic, but it is not easy to test scientifically.
POTENTIAL FUTURE SCENARIOS OF COVID-19
As COVID-19 is a new disease, we should make a distinc-
tion between (1) the current 2019–2020 ‘virgin soil 
pandemic’ caused by SARS- CoV-2, specifically in how it 
will further spread around the globe in the first wave, 
and (2) the potential future transmission in subsequent 
waves. In some countries, transmission will continue at 
lower levels. In other countries, such as China, the virus 
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may have been eliminated but can be reintroduced in 
identical or mutated form.
For the current first wave, using influenza and the 
common cold as reasonable comparisons, it is possible 
that the major epidemics, as witnessed in Wuhan, 
northern Italy, or New York, will typically occur in 
temperate climates in the winter season. Some predict 
that such epidemics will last between 8 and 10 weeks 
(but this is just a plausible and reasonable comparison 
in analogy with seasonal influenza). It is possible that 
in hotter climates the transmission may become contin-
uous, year round at lower levels. It is increasingly clear 
that hot climate does not exclude superspreading events 
as observed in Guayaquil, Ecuador and in various cities in 
Brazil. Ventilation, air- conditioning and crowded places 
may still create favourable environments for intensive 
transmission. It is also quite possible that the more diffi-
cult spread of SARS- CoV-2 in such climates may, in certain 
Table 6 Knowns, uncertainties and unknowns about severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS- CoV-2), as of 
May 2020
Factor Available information
Origin of
SARS- CoV-2
 ► Most probably from bats via intermediate animal hosts to index case.47 104All subsequent cases 
resulted from human- to- human transmission.
Transmission  ► Mainly through respiratory droplets from infected persons105; by hands, after contamination at 
nose, mouth or eyes; also through air on exposure to sneezing or coughing from an infected 
person at close distance.
 ► Through aerosols, while singing/talking loudly in congregations, groups, parties, karaoke, and so 
on, especially in poorly ventilated spaces.18 106
 ► Through fomites.107
 ► Possibly via faecal–oral route108 109; detection in sewage.110–112
 ► Related to peak in upper respiratory tract viral load prior to symptom onset in presymptomatic 
(paucisymptomatic) persons.106 113 114
 ► Transmission dynamics in asymptomatic persons not fully elucidated although viral shedding 
occurs.115
Influence of climate 
and/or air pollution on 
transmission
 ► Influence of climate on the capacity of the virus to survive outside human body (in air, in droplets, 
on surfaces, etc.) and to spread has been speculative.
 ► May spread more readily in milder/colder climate116 117; although variability of the reproductive 
number could not be explained by temperature or humidity.118
 ► Existing levels of air pollution may play a role; air pollutants, such as particulate matter, nitrogen 
dioxide and carbon monoxide, are likely a factor facilitating longevity of virus particles.119
 ► Elevated exposure to common particulate matter can alter host immunity to respiratory viral 
infections.119
Immunity—protective 
antibodies
 ► IgM and IgA antibody response 5–10 days after onset of symptoms, does not depend on 
clinical severity, correlates with virus neutralisation; IgG is observed ~14 days after onset of 
symptoms,93 120 may or may not correspond to protective immunity. Whether antibody response is 
long lasting has remained unclear.
 ► Rechallenge in rhesus macaques showed immunity post primary infection.121 How protective 
immunity after first infection is against subsequent infection with an identical or mutated strain has 
been uncertain.
 ► Incidental reports showed recovered persons positive by real- time PCR,122 123 later attributed to 
testing errors.
Seroprevalence to 
SARS- CoV-2
 ► Reported estimates for seroprevalence range between 0.4% and 59.3%124; differences in timing of 
the serosurvey, the use of assay kits with varying sensitivity/specificity, and different methods for 
detection may contribute to this large variation.125
 ► Seemingly high seroprevalence may be due to cross- reactive epitopes between SARS- CoV-2 and 
other HCoVs.126 127
 ► Whether seroprevalence implies immune protection is unclear, yet, some countries have 
considered use of ‘immunity passports’.128
 ► For herd immunity to be effectively achieved, an estimated seroprevalence of 60% of the 
population will be required.37 Other studies estimate between 5.66% and 85% seroprevalence in 
different countries.129–131
Rate of variability/
mutation in SARS- 
CoV-2
 ► Mutation rate: ~10−3 substitutions per year per site132 133; 13 mutation sites have been identified as 
of May 2020, suggesting selective mutations.134
 ► The low mutation rate suggests that a vaccine would be a single vaccine rather than a new vaccine 
every year like the influenza vaccine.135
 ► Ten different circulating clades (nextstrain.org; www.gisaid.org),136 as of May 2020.
HCoV, human coronaviruses.
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communities, be compensated for by human factors such 
as higher population density, closer human contacts and 
lesser hygiene (as, for instance, exist in urban slums in 
mega cities in low income countries). How all this plays 
out in sub- Saharan Africa, in its slums and remote areas, 
is still largely unknown. With SARS- CoV-2, transmission 
scenarios are mainly based on mathematical models 
despite their serious limitations (box 2).
As the virus continues to circulate, it will progressively 
be less of a ‘new disease’ during subsequent waves. The 
immunity caused by the first epidemic will influence how 
the virus spreads and causes disease. Whether later waves 
will become progressively milder or worse, as observed in 
the 1918–19 Spanish influenza, is a matter of intense spec-
ulation. Both views seem plausible and the two are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, immunity should be 
defined on two levels: individual immunity and herd immu-
nity. Individual immunity will dictate how mild or severe 
the disease will be in subsequent infections. Herd immu-
nity could be defined in different communities/regions/
Table 7 Knowns, uncertainties and unknowns about COVID-19, as of May 2020
Factor Available information
Disease spectrum  ► Many different estimates:
 ► Initially, it was estimated that among infected, 30% remained asymptomatic, 55%–80% had 
mild/moderate disease, 10%–14% had severe disease, and 5%–6% became critically ill.73 90–92
 ► Very variable estimates for remaining totally asymptomatic (estimated 5%–80%93–96).
 ► What determines that an infection remains asymptomatic?
 ► Quasi- absence of disease in children: why?
Case fatality rate (CFR)  ► Initial estimates CFR: 2%–3%; comparisons: influenza 0.1%; common cold: 0%; SARS: 9%–
10%; MERS: 30%.97
 ► Calculated infection fatality rates (cIFR) and calculated CFR (cCFR) on the Princess Diamond 
were 1.3% and 2.6%, respectively (for all ages combined), and projected cIFR and cCFR for 
China were between 0.6%–0.66% and 1.2%–1.38%, respectively.90 98 In Gangelt, Germany: 
cCFR of 0.37%.99
 ► CFR is influenced significantly by age; male sex; comorbidities; body mass index and/or fitness; 
and adequacy of supportive treatment, mainly oxygen therapy.100 101 Also, as in certain other viral 
diseases such as measles, possibly influenced by the dose of virus in initial infectious inoculum 
(see Box 3).
 ► CFR and IFR vary depending on population distribution. March 2020, estimated IFR UK: 
0.9%, Italy: 1.14%–6.22% initial estimate which increased to 9.26%, Spain: 6.16%, France: 
4.21%.102 103
Medication/treatment 
options
 ► Treatments being used: hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine, remdesivir, azithromycin, 
convalescent plasma and other antivirals.
 ► At the time of writing (May 2020), no proven effective treatment. Many clinical trials ongoing.
 ► Oxygen therapy most essential component of case management. Low oxygen saturation a 
dominant feature of COVID-19, curiously dissociated from dyspnoea. In most cases, oxygen can 
be administered through a facial mask. In very advanced disease, oxygen administered through 
artificial ventilation, requiring sophisticated equipment and highly skilled personnel.
Table 8 Questions and considerations in case a COVID-19 vaccine is developed
Question Considerations
If a vaccine is developed?  ► What type of vaccine will it be (live/non- live, classic killed, DNA, or recombinant)?
 ► Will it need special manufacture and transport conditions (such as cold chain)?
 ► How robust will be vaccine- acquired immunity? After how many doses?
 ► How protective will it be against infection?
 ► For how long will vaccine- acquired immunity last? And hence: how often will the 
vaccine have to be administered? Only once? Or yearly?
 ► Will there be any adverse effects?
Acquired immunity is not very 
strong; hence, what is the 
consequence regarding herd 
immunity?
 ► To achieve herd immunity, how efficient will the vaccine need to be?
 ► What proportion of the population (critical population) will need to be vaccinated?
 ► How long will it take to effectively vaccinate the critical population?
 ► Will vaccination be acceptable in the population? Or will vaccine hesitancy reduce 
uptake?
What are the socioeconomic 
implications?
 ► Which countries will get the vaccine first (implications for LICs/LMICs)?
 ► How expensive will the vaccine be?
 ► Will vaccination be made mandatory, especially for international travel?
LICs/LMICs, low and lower middle income countries.
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countries that, in theory, could be fenced off, allowing only 
limited interaction with other areas, impacting the spread 
of the virus to more vulnerable populations.
The future is unknown, but we can think of likely 
futures and critical elements therein.
Some obvious critical elements are:
 ► Will there be an effective vaccine? How soon? How 
effective? How available at scale? How acceptable?
 ► Will there be an effective treatment? How soon? How 
effective? How available at scale?
CONCLUSION
The current first wave is unfolding in the absence of 
effective biomedical tools (no vaccine, no effective anti-
viral or immune- modulating medicine, only supportive 
treatment such as oxygen therapy). This comes close to 
what can be called a ‘natural evolution’ of the COVID-19 
pandemic, mostly modified by the containment measures 
deployed (table 5) and the effect of supportive treatment.
Progressively, we can learn more about the direct 
health effects of COVID-19 (morbidity and mortality), 
about appropriate individual and collective measures,68 
the various degrees of societal disruption and the collat-
eral effects on other essential health services (eg, reluc-
tance to use health services for other health problems, 
because of ‘corona fear’). Our growing knowledge may 
enable us to progressively improve our response.
Learning from the variety of ways the COVID-19 
epidemic is unfolding across the globe provides important 
‘ecological evidence’ and creates insights into its epide-
miology and impacts. Until now, the insights gained on 
COVID-19 have been largely dominated by the COVID-19 
epidemics in the Global North. More understanding of 
lived experiences of people in a variety of contexts, where 
the epidemic is spreading more slowly and with different 
impacts, is necessary to get a full global picture and allow 
learning from this variety. This is an important missing 
piece of the COVID-19 puzzle.
BMJ Global Health and Emerging Voices for Global 
Health have launched a call (https:// blogs. bmj. com/ 
bmjgh/ 2020/ 05/ 26/ from- models- to- narratives- and- 
back- a- call- for- on- the- ground- analyses- of- covid- 19- 
spread- and- response- in- africa/) for such on- the- ground 
narratives and analyses of the spread of and response to 
COVID-19, local narratives and analyses that will hope-
fully help to further enrich our understanding of how 
and why the COVID-19 pandemic continues to unfold 
in multiple local epidemics along diverse trajectories 
around the globe.
Table 9 Some critical unknowns in SARS- CoV-2 transmission
Critical unknowns Considerations
Which transmission patterns will occur and 
will human- to- human transmission continue 
permanently?
 ► Seasonal transmission in temperate climate?
 ► Continuous tides, with ups and downs?
 ► The experience from China and some other countries showed that ‘local 
elimination’ is possible but risk of reintroduction remains.
 ► Increasingly unlikely that elimination everywhere is possible.
This will strongly depend on:
How strong will the acquired immunity after a 
first infection with SARS- CoV-2 be and how 
long will it last?
 ► Evidence of acquired immunity against subsequent infections has been 
limited.
 ► Measurable antibodies have been observed in most persons who 
have recovered from COVID-19,131 and research in animal models has 
suggested limited possibility of reinfection.121
 ► It is still unclear as to how robust the immunity is and how long it will last.
 ► Debate on use, practicality and ethics of ‘immunity passports’ for those 
recovered from COVID-19 has been ongoing.128 137
How stable is the virus (mutation) and do the 
different clades seen worldwide have any effect 
on the transmission potential/severity of the 
disease?
 ► If the virus mutates quickly and different strains develop, then antibody- 
dependent enhancement might be an important risk, as in dengue with its 
four different strains. If so, then in subsequent waves progressively more 
severe cases could occur.
 ► This has been reported for the Spanish influenza, where the second and 
third waves were characterised by a more severe disease pattern.36 84
What is the role of children in transmission?  ► Children have quasi- universally presented less severe disease. However, 
their susceptibility to infection remains unclear, with large heterogeneity 
reported between studies.138 139
 ► Their role in transmission has remained unclear, but evidence points to a 
more modest role in transmission than adults.
How significant are asymptomatic carriers in 
transmission?
 ► There have been several reports of asymptomatic transmission140 141 and 
estimates based on modelling.114
 ► Increasing consensus that asymptomatic carriers play an important role in 
transmission.
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